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Abstract 
 
This study articulates the interaction between institutional governance, education and 
economic growth. Given the current pursuit of education policy reforms and knowledge 
economy around the world, it is of policy relevance to theoretically analyze the main 
mechanisms by which the macroeconomic impact of education on growth (and economic 
development) occurs. Our theoretical model demonstrates how incentives offered by the 
government affect human capital accumulation which ultimately engenders positive economic 
development externalities. We articulate two main channels through which education affects 
economic growth. The first channel highlights direct positive effect of educational quality on 
the incentive to accumulate human capital by individuals, which makes them more 
productive. The second channel appears in the explicit function of the economic growth rate. 
As a policy implication, we have shown that the growth rate depends on the rate of return on 
human capital or that this rate of return itself depends on the quality of governance, which 
further increases growth. As a result, institutional quality has a double dividend, which 
suggests considerable benefits to educational reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on the quantifiable measurement of educational return or performance at the 
microeconomic level has been developed considerably. This development is consistent with 
the growing availability of socio-economic data. This literature has been centered on the 
utility function or the Jacob Mincer equation.  
In accordance with this fundamental equation, the salary of a representative individual is 
presented as a function of the number of his/her education years: period spent at school.  
Thus, this feature enables the measurability of an extra year of study by its marginal effect on 
the utility function.  Accordingly, the decision to extend the number of schooling years results 
from an arbitrage in which at equilibrium, every individual is indifferent in the choice 
between two potential options: the option to continue his/her studies or the option to 
immediately enter the labour market. This choice is influenced by the teachings of the human 
capital theory, developed by Becker (1964).   
In essence, according to this theory, the decision by economic agents to unfold their 
educational careers depends on: a comparison between benefits in terms of growth in salaries 
once they integrate the labour market and the opportunity cost in terms of revenue lost if they 
should decide to pursue an additional year of education. The return of education is explained 
in the human capital theory by a fundamental hypothesis: passage through the curriculum 
tends to increase productivity and therefore the income of individuals. 
The main predictions of this theory on the effectiveness of the educational system are based 
on two fundamental assumptions. The first is based on the assumption of marginal returns of 
production factors. Under perfect competition, the salary of an individual is determined by 
marginal productivity. The second hypothesis is based on the direct link between the effective 
productivity of individuals and the knowledge acquired during an educational career. In the 
theory of human capital, the educational system enables the acquisition of productive skills. 
Certainly one of the main functions of education is the transmission of knowledge that is 
intended to facilitate the adaptation of societies to economic changes.  
 
However, an alternative theory called the ‘signal of filter’ theory by Spence (1973) has 
interpreted the positive correlation between education and salaries. In this theory, the main 
function of the school is not to train but to classify and select individuals. According to this 
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paradigm, school or education provides no real skills to individuals, but simply select and 
reveal those skills (individuals) that are most suitable at the outset. Accordingly, in a context 
of uncertainty or asymmetric information on the effective productive skills of individuals, 
education has an informative role in providing the labour market an effective means of 
selecting employees because recruitment is most often characterized by uncertainty. With 
respect to this theory, education does not produce but identify qualities that are valorized by 
the entrepreneurial sector. Hence, the length of schooling and the quality of training will 
remain important signals enabling the identification of good candidates, even if the content of 
the training matters less. This is why instead of validating the knowledge transmitted and 
acquired, the education of individuals works more like a signal. According to this theory, 
education has an essential function of serving as a filter in revealing to the society talents of 
individuals that are most qualified ex-ante. It seems obvious to us that the theory of Spence 
(1973) is analogous to the biological theory of the principle of disability by Zahavi (1975). 
 
If it is difficult to decide between the human capital theory and the theory of signal, at the 
empirical level they are not really different at the level of demand for education. According to 
the theoretical predictions of the two competing theories in the socio-economic system, 
individuals are naturally motivated to seek further education in order to obtain a higher salary, 
irrespective of the type of education functions: training and selection. Indeed, school 
education currently occupies an increasing role in the social life of developed countries as 
well as developing countries, as evidenced by improvements in the average years of schooling 
and the role of qualifications in facilitating integration into the labor market. 
 
Finally, regardless of the theoretical framework, it should be noted that the measurement of 
private school return by the number schooling years is too simplistic. Indeed, the recent 
literature seems to ignore the role of social interactions and externalities associated with them 
in the formation of human capital. These externalities exist between individuals or groups of 
individuals or between successive generations. Similarly, social infrastructure plays a 
fundamental role in the incentives for human capital accumulation (Hall and Jones, 1999). 
The impact of this set of educational externalities is deduced from the analysis of the 
educational performance at the macroeconomic level. 
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A seminal analysis of the macroeconomic impact of education on growth has been provided 
by neo-classical growth models (Solow, 1956; Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). 
These authors have shown empirically from cross-sectional data that, that human capital 
proxied by the rate of scholarly enrollment practically plays the same role in the production 
function as physical capital. Consequently, the extension of schooling years tends to increase 
the productive efficiency of the labor force. Thus, increasing the induced productivity tends to 
offset the effects of diminishing returns to capital and hence, the long term growth. As a 
corollary, the implementation of sustained economic growth requires an increase in the 
educational level of the population in countries. The macroeconomic outcome validates at the 
global level those from the microeconomic predictions. 
 
However, the main results of Mankiw, Romer and Weil, were seriously challenged by 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (2001). These authors, not only sustain by their 
empirical analysis that there is no effect of human capital on the income of nations, but also 
show that sometimes the level of human capital has a negative impact on income. However, 
their negative results were also questioned by Kruger and Lindahl (2001) who were able to 
empirically validate the positive impact of human capital on economic growth. A study by 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) had raised great doubts on the basic main micro econometric 
result of the positive correlation between education and income. 
 
Indeed, in order to reconcile the robustness of this result at the macroeconomic level, it is 
relevant to take into account the presence and quality of the externality of social infrastructure 
(Hall and Jones, 1999). Since the seminal paper of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) on the 
crucial role of the quality of institutions and the economic development of nations, a new 
literature on the quality of governance institutions and the performance of nations has 
emerged. Accordingly, given the substantial educational policy reforms in the world, it is 
worthwhile to theoretically analyze at a macroeconomic level, the main mechanisms through 
which the positive impact of education on growth (and economic development) occurs. One 
of the main channels through which the effect of human capital passes is the productivity of 
the educational sector. The quality of this sector varies with countries, the level of endemic 
corruption and incentives involved (Reinikka and Svensson 2005, Rogers 2008, Gupta, 
Davoodi and Tiongson 2001). 
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Our theoretical paper attempts to reconcile the above stylized facts on the nexus between 
education and growth by formally investigating the relationship between the quality of 
governance, education and growth. We will show the horizon of educational dividends when 
the establishment of good governance is taken into account.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the characteristics of a simple 
model. The characterization of equilibrium growth is covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
 
2.  A Simple Model 
 Let us consider a simple model describing a small open economy within the framework of 
nested generation. The two-period model examines the behavior of two generations: young 
and old. In each period, individuals are endowed with one unit of working time (we do not 
consider leisure time for simplicity). Young people either have the choice between working in 
the first period for income generation or study to improve their human capital which is 
inherited from the generation of their parents. Indeed, it is assumed that education generates a 
positive externality from one generation to another (Azariadis and Drazen 1990). 
The income generated is spent on consumption and savings. It is assumed that the old cannot 
devote their time to studies: they only work and eat without leaving debts. The wealth of the 
economy depends on the overall level of savings. This wealth consists of the stock of physical 
capital which is used with labour and the stock of knowledge or technology by the 
competitive sector of national firms. 
This simple analytical framework enables the characterization of incentives for education 
undertaken by young agents, as well as national aggregate output. Finally, we assume that the 
population size of all is unitary. 
  
2.1 Behavior of individuals  
       An individual born in period t is assumed to maximize the following inter temporal utility 
function: 
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where: u’(.)>0  and u’’(.)<0  are the standard hypotheses and   is the temporal discount rate.  
Utility is defined as the amount of consumption of the first and second periods  ttt ccc
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where t is the index denoting the birth period of the youths. Individuals maximize their given 
inter-temporal utility function (Eq. (1)), under the following budgetary constraints: 
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tt
www  is the vector of real salaries by unit of effective time in the periods t and t+1, 
1t
r  is global interest rate for saving collected in period t with the supposition that the 
financial market is efficient; and 
th
1
 is the level of human capital inherited from the old 
generation, such as the preceding generation, which reveals an inter-generational externality. 
 
In the first period, the youths are presumed to allocate a portion of their time (unity) to 
education of quantity (number of years)  
te  which induces a rate of academic return  
depending on the quality of governance of the national education system.  
A direct extension of this representation is to assume that in a game of social interaction, the 
performance also depends on the externality from the average general educational level (Jellal 
and Bouzahzah 2012). 
The term corporate governance includes, among others, the prevalence of corruption, quality 
and teachers’ civics, and the quality of educational infrastructure. The quality of governance 
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is given by a scale parameter S, denoting the index of institutional quality with the following 
assumptions:  
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And the institutional quality of the educational system is assumed to be complementary in 
terms of performance relative to the number schooling years. It is also assumed that human 
capital depreciates per unit time at a given constant rate  . 
Taking into account these assumptions and constraints, the inter-temporal utility optimization 
program of a representative individual becomes: 
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The equilibrium conditions of the first order are as follows: 
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The interpretation of these results is straightforward and intuitively easy. The equilibrium 
condition in Eq. (7) tells us that the optimal savings is given by the equality between the 
marginal utility of consumption when young, with the expected marginal utility at old age. 
Then, the condition characterizing the optimal length of schooling is given by the equality 
between the marginal cost in terms of consumption utility in the first period with the expected 
gain of the marginal utility of consumption allowed by the extension of  human capital, as 
well as its rate of return. In addition, we note that the optimal duration of schooling is 
independent of the discount rate, as well as individual preferences. This result is very similar 
to that of Jones (2007) in a macroeconomic framework. 
 
Proposition 1  
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The optimal duration of schooling is based on social mobility and the financial opportunity 
cost and is given by the following equation: 
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 Proof: 
 The result is obtained by a simple substitution game of Eqs. (7) and (8). 
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where g is the rate of expected wage growth and  assuming no uncertainty, we obtain: 
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Consequently, this simple rewrite tells us that the optimal duration of education is done by the 
usual trade-off between financial performance and the returns to human capital given by the 
rate of wage growth. This result highlights the role of education in the quest for upward social 
mobility and pending emergence of the middle class (like in Arab countries). 
 
Corollary 1  
We have results from the following comparative statics: 
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Proof : 
From Eq. (9) we obtain by simple representation: 
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Also :  
 
           (13) 
     
These results seem to be very important because they provide us with the conditions that drive 
the accumulation of human capital, the length of schooling and the training of an effective 
productive workforce. Indeed, the first result tells us that the institutional quality of the 
educational or school system S is fundamental as a variable. The variable can be 
approximated by the rate of supervision of countries like Morocco.  
Then the second result tells us that an efficient financial system seems to be a substitutable 
element to the rate of return on human capital in order to ensure consumer spending in the 
second period (although it is necessary to extend the discussion on the equality of  rates  as a 
puzzle ). 
Finally, the last result is directly related to the given upward social mobility or interpreted 
here as the rate of wage growth (to be linked with empirical studies as well as the 
technological diffusion rate) 
 
3. Entrepreneurs and Economic Growth  
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Firms are expected to operate competitively in the goods as well as in the input markets. They 
are identical and maximize their profits. The national aggregate output is given by a 
production function in constant returns to scale with respect to aggregate physical capital K 
and the actual total amount of work H: 
               
tttt
HKFAY ,                                                                       (14) 
where :         ttttt
t
hehheH
111
21                                             (15)     
and where A(t) denotes the stock of existing technology or the state of knowledge or social 
infrastructure of the country under consideration. 
Given the assumption of constant returns, the output per unit of effective labor is given by: 
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where   : 
t
t
t
H
K
k    is physical capital per unit of efficient or effective labor. 
The competitive behavior of firms leads to the following first order equilibrium conditions: 
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Here it is assumed that physical capital K depreciates at the same rate as human capital and 
where the interest rate is given for firms choosing their optimal equipment. And physical 
capital is an increasing function of the increase in total factor productivity A(t), and the 
quality of the actual human capital stock. 
At a steady state A, r, e, and f (k) are constant and thus the growth rate of the economy is 
given by: 
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Proposition 2   
Institutional governance generates a Double Dividend, since the economic growth rate 
increasingly depends on the schooling rate as well as the quality of the educational system: 
 
   eSg ˆ,ˆ
 
Proof :  
It is evident and omitted.  
This result is very relevant to us. Indeed, the index of the quality of corporate governance 
given by the S parameter seems to play-out (by means of two main channels) a fundamental 
role on the rate of growth (directly or indirectly based on incentives). Accordingly, we respect 
to the first or direct channel, good corporate governance tends to encourage individuals to 
invest in long lengths of study which involves strong human capital accumulation and directly 
affects the growth rate. Moreover, as the economic growth rate depends on the rate of return 
on human capital, good governance institutions also impact this performance and therefore 
translate this impact on the growth rate of the economy. Accordingly, the second channel 
appears in the explicit function of the economic growth rate. 
It is easy to empirically show that the duration of studies are increasing functions of the 
quality of institutions in countries (Jellal 2012). Similarly lengthy schooling years directly and 
positively affect research & development (R & D) and therefore the growth in advanced 
countries by means technical progress. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This study has articulated the interaction between institutional governance, education and 
economic growth. Given the current pursuit of education policy reforms and knowledge 
economy around the world, it is of policy relevance to theoretically analyze the main 
mechanisms by which the macroeconomic impact of education on growth (and economic 
development) occurs. Our theoretical model demonstrates how incentives offered by the 
government affect human capital accumulation which ultimately engenders positive economic 
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development externalities. We articulate two main channels through which education affects 
economic growth. The first channel highlights direct positive effect of educational quality on 
the incentive to accumulate human capital by individuals, which makes them more 
productive. The second channel appears in the explicit function of the economic growth rate. 
As a policy implication, we have shown that the growth rate depends on the rate of return on 
human capital or that this rate of return itself depends on the quality of governance, which 
further increases growth. As a result, institutional quality has a double dividend, which 
suggests considerable benefits to educational reforms (e.g. in a country like Morocco). 
 Future studies devoted to improving the extant literature can focus on investigating if 
the established theoretically linkages withstand empirical validity.  
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